

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 159404  
ORIGIN PM-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EUR-12 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01  
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SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-07  
NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 /088 R

DRAFTED BY PM/DCA:MARIETTI:BPW  
APPROVED BY PM:LHGELB  
ACDA:J TWOMBLY  
EUR/SOV:S MCCALL  
NEA/IRN:C NAAS

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O 082245Z JUL 77 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 159404

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, XO

SUBJECT: US-SOVIET TALKS ON INDIAN OCEAN ARMS LIMITATIONS

REF: STATE 142360

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF US-SOVIET TALKS ON INDIAN OCEAN ARMS LIMITATIONS IS PROVIDED FOR AMBASSADOR'S USE IN AN ORAL BRIEFING OF THE SHAH. US AND SOVIET SIDES AGREED THAT TALKS SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL, BUT US RESERVED RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS. US HAS NOT YET BRIEFED OTHER LITTORAL STATES (EXCEPT AUSTRALIANS) ON COURSE OF TALKS AND IS PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION TO SHAH ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.

2. INITIAL ROUND OF TALKS TOOK PLACE JUNE 22-27 IN MOSCOW.

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TALKS WERE SERIOUS, POSITIVE, AND NON-POLEMICAL. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN LATE SEPTEMBER, LEAVING EXACT DATE AND VENUE TO BE DECIDED LATER.

3. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN INITIAL ROUND OF TALKS WERE TO EXPLORE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN SEEKING AN INDIAN OCEAN ARMS LIMITATIONS AGREEMENT, AND

TO MAKE CLEAR OUR OWN SERIOUSNESS. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS, BUT THAT THERE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET APPROACH AND OURS, AND THAT LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE AN AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. BOTH SIDES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CURRENT US AND SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN IS NOT AT A HIGH LEVEL AND THAT THERE IS A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ESCALATING ARMS RACE. US OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK IN THE FIRST INSTANCE A STABILIZATION OF US AND SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY AND PRESENCE. ONCE STABILIZATION IS ACHIEVED WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER MOVING TOWARDS REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY PRESENCE. THE LEVEL OF MILITARY PRESENCE WHICH WOULD BE PERMITTED UNDER A STABILIZATION AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE NATURE AND TIMING OF ANY SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS ARE MATTERS WHICH MUST BE DETERMINED IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

4. A COMMON THREAD THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THEIR CONCERN THAT THE US IS ENGAGING IN THE BUILDING UP OF AN INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT STRATEGIC FORCES CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE SOVIET UNION. THEY DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF FORCES WHICH THEY CONSIDERED RELATED TO REGIONAL INTERESTS (AND THEY EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED THE US INTEREST IN ENSURING SECURITY OF SEA LANES FOR COMMERCIAL AND OIL TRAFFIC) AND OTHER FORCES WHICH--THEY ASSERTED--  
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COULD STRIKE THE SOVIET HOMELAND. THEY PRESSED FOR A BAN ON SSBN'S, B-52'S AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. WE REPLIED THAT OUR PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS NOT A THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION; THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE BANNING OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS; BUT THAT GENERAL NAVAL LIMITS WOULD ALSO CONSTRAIN SYSTEMS THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT.

5. THE SOVIETS STATED THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES AND FACILITIES OF US ALLIES IN THE REGION. THEY ALSO SOUGHT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF US FORCES IN ADJACENT AREAS, SUCH AS THE PHILIPPINES, WHICH THEY CLAIMED WOULD ALLOW THE US TO SURGE RAPIDLY INTO THE AREA. THE US REJECTED THESE SOVIET POSITIONS. WE SAID THE TALKS ARE BILATERAL AND DO NOT CONCERN THE MILITARY FORCES OF OTHER EXTERNAL STATES WHICH HAVE THEIR OWN INTERESTS TO PROTECT IN THE REGION, OR OF THE LITTORAL STATES AND THAT WE ARE ONLY WILLING TO DISCUSS OUR FORCES PRESENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, NOT ADJACENT AREAS.

6. ON OTHER ISSUES THE SOVIETS WERE SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE.

A. WE PROPOSED A DEFINITION OF THE AREA FOR PURPOSES OF NAVAL LIMITS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL OF THE WATERS ENCLOSED BY THE ARC FORMED; ON THE WEST, BY THE EASTERN COAST OF AFRICA; ON THE NORTH, BY THE SOUTHERN COAST OF ASIA; AND, ON THE EAST, BY THE MALAY PENINSULA, THE SOUTHERN SHORE OF INDONESIA, AND THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN COAST. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE THE RED SEA AND THE PERSIAN GULF. THE SOVIETS DISAGREED OVER WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE NEAR AUSTRALIA, PUSHING TO INCLUDE MORE OF THE WATERS OFF THE SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN COASTS OF AUSTRALIA.

B. SHIP DEPLOYMENTS--BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A LIMITATION ON SHIP DEPLOYMENTS MEASURED IN SECRET

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TERMS OF SOME COMBINATION OF SHIP DAYS AND TON DAYS. THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT ON THE TYPES OF SHIPS TO BE INCLUDED AS AUXILIARIES IN ANY LIMITATION AGREEMENT, WITH THE US PRESSING TO INCLUDE ALL SHIPS WHICH SUPPORT A NAVAL PRESENCE, WHILE THE SOVIETS PROPOSED A MORE LIMITED DEFINITION.

C. SUPPORT FACILITIES. THE SOVIETS INITIALLY PRESSED FOR THE "DISMANTLING" OF DIEGO GARCIA. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE SECURITY OF US TENURE THERE PUTS THIS FACILITY IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY FROM OTHER FACILITIES IN THE AREA. THE US MADE CLEAR IT WOULD NOT "DISMANTLE" DIEGO GARCIA, AND COUNTERED THAT THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER OR NOT THE US OR THE SOVIET UNION "CONTROL" A BASE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, BUT RATHER THAT BOTH MAKE USE OF FACILITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TO SUPPORT THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE SAID WE WERE READY TO CONSIDER LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF DIEGO GARCIA ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FACILITIES BY BOTH SIDES. THE SOVIETS ADMITTED THAT THEY MAINTAINED A COMMUNICATIONS STATION AND DRY DOCK IN BERBERA, SOMALIA, AND USED SOME OTHER FACILITIES THERE (ALTHOUGH THEY CONTINUED TO CLAIM THAT THESE OTHER FACILITIES ARE UNDER SOMALI, NOT SOVIET CONTROL). THE SOVIETS AT THE END STATED THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER LIMITATIONS ON THEIR USE OF SOMALI FACILITIES AS PART OF AN AGREEMENT.

7. IN SUMMARY, SOVIETS LAID OUT MAXIMALIST POSITION WHICH THEY WILL HAVE TO FALL BACK FROM IF THERE IS TO BE PROGRESS. BUT THEY ARE CLEARLY INTERESTED IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD MEET SOME OF THEIR SECURITY CONCERNS. THE US MADE CLEAR IT WOULD NOT ACCEPT UNEQUAL RESTRICTIONS NOR ANY LIMITATIONS THAT INFRINGE ON THE INTERESTS OF OUR SECRET

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FRIENDS OR ALLIES. WE WOULD WELCOME IRANIAN COMMENTS ON  
PARTICULAR ISSUES WHICH RELATE TO THEIR INTERESTS. VANCE

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APPROVED BY: IO:BSWOPE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000

S E C R E T STATE 159404

FOR AMB. LEONARD

FOLL MSG RPT STATE 159404 SENT ACTION TEHRAN DTD 08 JULY.

QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 159404

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, XO

SUBJECT: US-SOVIET TALKS ON INDIAN OCEAN ARMS LIMITATIONS

REF: STATE 142360

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**Type:** TE  
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US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
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